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Emile Durkheim opened his Latin thesis with an observation worth remembering 
when reflecting on how the social sciences have defined their boundaries.  
A discipline may be called a science only if it has a definite field to 
explore.  Science is concerned with things, realities.  If it does not have 
definite material to describe and interpret, it exists in a vacuum.  …    
At first sight, this problem presents no difficulty:  the subject matter of 
social science is social “things,” that is, laws, customs, religions, etc.  
However if we look into history, we find that until quite recent times, no 
philosopher ever viewed these matters in such a light. (Durkheim 1960, 3) 
Durkheim’s observation is significant both for what it asserts and for what it evades.  The 
man who laid down the rules of sociological method was emphatic that method alone 
does not make something a science:  it also needed a field of things to study.  He also 
saw, far more clearly than those who confidently find “anticipations” of the social 
sciences in the classics of political philosophy and history,  that the idea that “society” 
could be an object of study distinct from politics, psychology, and economics was of 
recent vintage.  Yet he was rather cavalier about what exactly made up the field of “social 
things”:  much hangs on how to continues the open-ended list that starts with “laws, 
customs, religions ….” 
What sorts of “things” do the social sciences study?  Where and when did they 
find them?  And how, in finding them, did they set themselves apart from kindred 
disciplines scrutinizing related “things”?  When we turn to the eighteenth century in 
search of the ancestors of the social sciences we find that those “social things” that 
provided Durkheim with the objects of the social sciences had already been claimed by 
disciplines devoted not to the study of “society,” but rather of something called “civil 
society.”  To see how the social sciences began to mark out they boundaries the would 
occupy, we must trace how analyses of “civil society” were replaced by accounts of a 
society that was no longer “civil.”  One place to begin is by asking what it meant, in the 
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eighteenth century, for something to be “civil.”1 
Samuel Johnson’s definition starts out simply enough:  “1.  Relating to the 
community; political; relating to the city or government.”  But it goes on to define “civil” 
in terms of what it is not, in the process producing a curious list:   
3.  Not in anarchy; not wild; not without rule or government.  4.  Not 
foreign, intestine.  5.  Not ecclesiastical ….  6.  Not natural …. 7.  Not 
military ….  8.  Not criminal…. 9.  Civilised; not barbarous.  10.  
Complaisant;  civilized;  gentle;  well bred; elegant of manners;  not rude;  
not brutal;  not coarse.  11.  Grave; sober;  not gay or shewy. 12.  Relating 
to the ancient consular, or imperial government ….” (Johnson 1755).    
The entry for “société” in the Dictionnaire Universel of 1771 defines “société civile” by 
contrasting it to man’s “etat naturel,” which, we are told, is also a “social state,” but one 
without the binding force of laws that have been framed with the end of human happiness 
in mind.  Johann Christoph Adelung’s Grammatisch-kritisches Wörterbuch of 1793 
describes “bürgerliche Gesellschaft” as an order “where a multitude has subordinated 
itself to the will of one,” and contrasts it to “other societies, which arise out of parents 
and children.”  To be “bürgerliche” is to be estranged from refined morals, and a Bürger 
may be either a resident of a city who participates in the governing of that body, a 
member of a particular estate, or what is denoted in Latin by the term civis:  a citizen of a 
civil society, who — unlike the subject of a despotic state — owns property and enjoys 
freedom.2  Looking over these myriad definitions one sympathizes with the jurist John 
Austin who, in 1832, concluded that the term “civil” had become utterly useless,  since 
“it is applied to all manner of objects which are perfectly disparate” (Austin 1879, 780). 
                                                
1 It should be stressed that I shall pay little attention to the renewed popularity of the 
term in recent years.  For discussions see Cohen & Arato 1992 (esp. 29-82), 
Seligman 1992, Tester 1992.  
2 The much briefer definition in Campe’s Wörterbuch der Deutschen Sprache likewise 
contrasts the “bürgerliche Leben” to life in domestic (häusliche) society.  
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Things, however,  are not quite as haphazard as they seem.  While definitions of 
civility and civil society may have proliferated wildly in the eighteenth century, the ways 
of talking about civil society clustered, for the most part,  around a few basic contrasts.  
Under the reigning influence of modern natural law theories, civil society was defined 
principally by contrasting it with a pre-political state of nature.  Those who spoke this 
way, as well as those who didn’t, could refine their understanding of civil society by 
contrasting it with two other forms of association:  the household (“domestic society”) 
and the church (“ecclesiastical society”).  Finally, civil (or “civilized”) society could also 
be defined by contrasting it with those “rude” societies inhabited by “savages” who lived 
without laws, conveniences, or commerce.  Pruning Dr. Johnson’s list we can say that in 
the eighteenth century a “civil society” was a society which, having placed itself under a 
system of laws, had left the state of nature, was distinguished from domestic and religious 
communities, and had progressed beyond the state of savagery in which rude peoples 
dwelled.  But rather than merge these definitions we might do better to keep them 
separate, and see how, within each of these different ways of talking about civil society, 
certain thinkers began formulating notions of society that did not fit easily into the 
distinction between what was civil and what was not.  In this way  “civil society” came to 
denote something quite different for G. W. F. Hegel, Alexis de Tocqueville, and Karl 
Marx than it had for their predecessors in the eighteenth century.  What it came to mean 
for them has consequences for the sorts of social sciences we have wound up with.   
  
Civil Society and the State of Nature 
Chapter VII of John Locke’s Second Treatise defines “political or civil society” in 
much the same way as Samuel Johnson:  it is chiefly concerned with what civil society 
isn't.  It is not to be confused with the “conjugal society” that unites husband and wife 
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(§77,78), nor should it be confused, as Locke’s nemesis Sir Robert Filmer had, with the 
“society bewixt parents and children” (§84).  The system of “absolute monarchy,” which 
some had considered “the only government in the world,” is dismissed as “inconsistent 
with civil society” and hence “no form of civil government at all” (§90).  Finally, civil 
society is completely different from the “state all men are naturally in,” that state of 
freedom and equality in which men are free “to order their actions, and dispose of their 
possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature” (§4).  
Divesting themselves of this natural liberty and putting on “the bonds of civil society,” 
men are able to form a community and enjoy a “comfortable, safe, and peaceful” life 
(§95). 
In the theory of the social contract, elaborated in countless variations before and 
after Locke, entry into civil society is predicated on a departure from a “state of nature.”  
Certain needs, dispositions, or aversions operative in this state provide its residents with 
the motivation to leave it.  The social contract lays out the terms of the bargain they strike 
upon exiting.  Through a consideration of what sorts of things individuals could (or 
ought) to have agreed to upon leaving the state of nature, certain forms of government 
can be ruled out as properly “civil” societies.  Thus Locke, reflecting on the claim that an 
unquestioning obedience to the monarch is the price that one must pay for security 
against one’s neighbors, asked whether such a bargain didn’t require supposing “that men 
are so foolish, that they take care to avoid what mischiefs can be done to them by pole 
cats, or foxes; but are content, nay think it safety, to be devoured by lions” (§93). 
Social contract theory thus provided a way of thinking about civil society which, 
beginning from a situation in which men had no laws, considered what sort of political 
order men might design for themselves were they given the chance to start afresh.   While 
there was a considerable range of opinion about what sorts of arrangements one might 
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adopt upon leaving the state of nature, the terms used to refer to the order one entered 
display a certain family resemblance.  It is a “political or civil society” (Locke), a “civil 
society,” “civitas,” or “commonwealth” (Hobbes, De Cive I:2, V:9, VI:1, X:1; Leviathan 
II:17), a “city,” “republic,” or “body politic” (Rousseau, Social Contract I:vi), a “civil 
condition (status civilis)” or “state (civitas)” (Kant, Rechtslehre §43).  The paradigm for 
these terms was laid down in a translation of Aristotle’s Politics completed in 1438 by 
the great Florentine humanist Leonardo Bruni.  At the start of the Politics, Aristotle stated 
that the “most sovereign and inclusive” of all communities “is what we call a polis or 
political community [koinonia politike]” (Pol. 1252a), a phrase Bruni rendered as “civitas 
appelator & civilis societas,” establishing a pattern that was followed by subsequent 
translators and taken up by those who constructed theories about the origin, nature, and 
limits of public life (Schmidt 1986). 
That social contract theorists should conform so faithfully to a terminology rooted 
in Aristotle is not without its ironies.  While Aristotle had given passing attention to 
forms of association such as the household or the village which preceded the polis 
temporally, he stressed that the polis was prior to them “by nature.”  Man, the famous 
definition goes, is by nature “a polis dwelling animal,” equipped with speech and reason, 
and disposed to spend his time arguing about what is just and what is not (Pol.  1253a; 
Nic. Eth. I:vii).  In social contract theories, in contrast, man may be naturally gregarious 
and perhaps even naturally disposed to form political associations.  Nevertheless, the 
state which men are in “by nature” is not a civil state.  Thus, while Thomas Hobbes did 
not deny “that men (even nature compelling) desire to come together” into various sorts 
of societies,  he did insist that “civil societies are not mere meetings, but bonds, to the 
making whereof faith and compacts are necessary.” Thus, “man is made fit for society 
not by nature, but by education” (De Cive I:2).  
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Because of this insistence that the establishment of civil society rested on an act 
of will, rather than on “actual things, like all other things in nature,”  Durkheim 
maintained that the social contract tradition had failed to isolate a domain of objects on 
which to establish a science of society (Durkheim 1960, 3-4).  By arguing this way, he 
foreclosed the possibility, explored by Ferdinand Tönnies (who, not accidentally, began 
his career as a Hobbes scholar) of basing sociology on the study of different forms of 
social willing and the different forms of association that arose from them.  Durkheim 
further argued that the concerns of social contract theorists differed from those of the 
social sciences in that they contrasted differing “types of states” rather than different 
“kinds of societies” since they “thought it impossible to compare human societies in any 
respect other than the form of state” (Durkheim 1960, 9).  This criticism has its merit.  
The equation of state and civil society (or, as Locke would have it, of political society 
and civil society) accepted by social contract theorists when they took up the terminology 
of Aristotle’s Politics made it difficult to talk about a “society” that is not immediately 
understood to be a “civil” or “political” society.  To be sure, one can find examples that 
seem to suggest otherwise. 
Locke, once again, provides the clearest example.  Chapter XIX of the Second 
Treatise — “Of the Dissolution of Government” — distinguishes between the 
“dissolution of society” and the “dissolution of government,”  arguing that while the 
former entails the latter, it is possible to “dissolve” government while leaving “society” in 
tact.  The argument hangs on a rather specific understanding of how societies “dissolve.” 
The usual, and almost only way whereby this union is dissolved, is the 
inroad of foreign force making a conquest upon them:  for in that case, 
(not being able to maintain and support themselves, as one intire  and 
independent body) the union belonging to that body must necessarily 
cease, and so every one return to the state he was in before, with a liberty 
to shift for himself, and provide for his own safety, as he thinks fit, in 
some other society (§211). 
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In the case of external invasions, conquerors swords “cut up governments by the roots, 
and mangle societies to pieces” — one need only recall what the Normans wrought to see 
Locke’s point.  But, it is also possible for governments to be “dissolved from within” 
(§212) and the bulk of Chapter XIX is devoted to documenting the different ways in 
which this could be done — most of which had been attempted by either Charles II or 
James II.   In such cases Locke insisted that while the government may have passed 
away, society is not dissolved and hence retains its native right to establish a new 
government.  It is important, however, not to overestimate what is going on here.  Locke 
was less concerned with distinguishing society from civil society than he was with 
working out the implications of his insistence that the act through which a government is 
established is not to be equated with the act that first creates a civil society.  Citizens 
may, with good enough cause, end the trusteeship arrangement on which government 
rests.  But in doing so, they have not dissolved the bonds that unite them into a civil 
society. 
The contrast Locke invoked had a long-standing precedent in the distinction 
between “pacts of association” (pactum societas) whereby individuals form a political 
association and “pacts of subjection” (pactum subjectionis) in which individuals so 
associated alienate their political agency to a ruler, with certain stated provisions and 
limits (Gierke 1939, 91-112, Gierke 1934, 107-108, 299-300).  It was possible for social 
contract theorists to see, instead of one social contract, a series of separate pacts.  Fichte’s 
Grundlage des Naturrechts carried this the furthest, arguing that the exit from the state of 
nature involved (1) a “Property or Civil Contract” (Eigenthums oder Civilvertrag) which, 
tacitly or explicitly, establishes claims to hold property, (2) a “Contract of Protection” 
(Schutzvertrag) in which individuals pledge to protect each others rights, and (3) a 
“Contract of Association” (Vereinigungsvertrag) which secures and protects the first two 
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compacts and takes the form of a pledge by each individual to protect the whole 
community.  Taken together these three contracts constitute what Fichte called the 
Staatsbürgervertrag (Fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts § 17B).  But it was also possible 
to simplify matters by arguing (like Hobbes) that there could be no pactum societas 
without a pactum subjectionis or insisting (like Locke and Rousseau) that the delegation 
of ministerial responsibilities did not involve a “contract” at all. 
The point to keep mind, however, is that those who distinguished the act which 
created government from the act which created civil society never seemed to think that 
doing so necessitated a distinction between state and society or between political society 
and civil society.  Locke and Rousseau could insist that government did not rest on a 
contract, while continuing to speak as if political society and the “state” or “city” were 
one and the same.  Locke certainly recognized that there were societies in the state of 
nature, and the discussion of property in Chapter V of the Second Treatise attempted to 
lay out the general rules by which property could arise (and, indeed, in which monetary 
exchange could be instituted) without the establishment of political relations, thus 
reconnoitering the terrain which would be explored by classical political economy 
(Dumont 1977, 53-54).  Likewise, Rousseau was sensitive enough to the role played by 
religion and custom in the creation of the “general will” that it is possible to see him as 
laying a foundation on which Tocqueville would later build.  But in both Locke and 
Rousseau these analyses of “society” are always in the service of an account of political 
society.  Neither appeared to be terribly interested in providing an account of a society 
that was anything other than civil.  
 
Civil Society and Domestic Society 
While social contract theorists dutifully invoked the Aristotlean identification of 
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state and civil society, the contrast between civil society and domestic society on which it 
rested was becoming less and less coherent.  Aristotle had simply stipulated that “what 
we call the polis” was what he was proposing to call a “political community [koinonia 
politike].”  His explication of what it meant for the polis to be political community was 
accomplished largely by juxtaposing the polis to a community of a rather different sort:  
the household.  In the process any number of questions were left begging (Schmidt 1986, 
296-298).  Were there forms of political community other than the Greek polis?  Aristotle 
was certainly aware of the different forms of political organization in the ancient world.  
Greek cities regularly formed military and political alliances,  outside the Greek world 
there were cities like Babylon that had occupied territories that dwarfed the polis,  and 
Aristotle lived to see Athens reduced to a Macedonian protectorate.  But he refused to 
characterize an alliance as a koinonia  (Politics 1261a,  1274b,  1328a), he had difficulty 
calling something the size of Babylon a polis  (Politics 1276a) and he ignored 
Macedonia.  One could also ask whether there might not be forms of association worth 
scrutinizing other than the oikos and the polis.  By way of example Aristotle mentioned 
that sailors on a ship constitute a koinonia (Nic. Eth. VIII: 9).  Couldn’t individuals 
engaged in long distance trade be said to form a community that reached beyond the 
polis?  On this point, Aristotle was silent.  While he was capable of talking quite sensibly 
about the rules of economic exchange,  in his classification of the sciences “economics,” 
was restricted to the household (Polayni 1968, Finley 1970). 
The Aristotlean division of practical philosophy into the disciplines of “ethics,” 
“politics,” and “economics” had a remarkable staying power (Brunner 1968, Maier 1969, 
Habermas 1973).  As late as 1728, Christian Wolff’s Preliminary Discourse on 
Philosophy in General  defined ethics as the science dealing with man “in his natural 
state,” politics as the discipline concerned with life “in a civil society or state,” and 
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economics as the science of “smaller societies … for example, conjugal, paternal, and 
domestic societies” (§§64-67).  Until well into the eighteenth century, whenever 
economics was discussed, references to householding were never far away.  Thus, in the 
Georgica Curiosa (1682), a manual for a noble head of a household, “economics” 
consisted of such matters as bee-keeping, pedagogy, legal and religious duties, wine-
making, glass-blowing, and something called “Aquarum Delitiis” — the study of how to 
travel on water, drink it, and fish in it (von Hohberg 1682).  Even James Steuart’s Inquiry 
into the Principles of Political Economy (1767) opened with a nod to the older tradition. 
Oeconomy, in general, is the art of providing for all the wants of a family, 
with prudence and frugality ….  What economy is in a family, political 
oeconomy is in a state: with these essential differences, however that in a 
state there are no servants, all are children; that a family may be when and 
how a man pleases, and he may establish what plan of oeconomy he thinks 
fit; but states are found formed, and the oeconomy of these depend on a 
thousand circumstances (Steuart 1966, 15-16). 
Echoes of this understanding of the place of political economy can still be found in Adam 
Smith.  Even though the Wealth of Nations analysed exchange relations as something 
distinct from the affective bonds of family life or the explicitly publicly oriented actions 
that make up the domain of politics, the Introduction to Book IV still characterized 
political economy as a contribution to the “science of the statesman.”   While Smith’s 
understanding of how the public household should be run differed markedly from Steuart, 
he was no more concerned than Steuart had been to argue that political economy was 
concerned with a domain that was fundamentally distinct from the state and the 
household (Winch 1978, 184-185). 
In retrospect it is obvious that Smith was grappling with a domain that could not 
easily be reconciled with an understanding of forms of association that spoke only of 
households and polities.  The Wealth of Nations investigated the rules by which a “natural 
order” was governed, an order which — in contrast to the “civil society” of the social 
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contract theorists — came into being without the conscious intention of any of the actors 
who constituted it.  Bernard Mandeville had provided perhaps the most striking account 
of the way this domain was ordered.  While Aristotle had argued that every koinonia was 
marked by ties of fellowship [philia]  and a sense of justice, and had stressed that since 
“philia seems to hold the polis together” lawmakers were justified in devoting more 
attention to it than to justice (Nic. Eth. VIII:1),  Mandeville earned his notoriety by 
describing how a society that possessed neither fellowship nor virtue could prosper and 
flourish (Hundert 1994).3  When Smith asked, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, what 
society needed to survive, he granted Mandeville’s argument about affection, and — 
reversing Aristotle’s priorities — pinned everything on justice. 
Though among the different members of the society there should be no 
mutual love and affection, the society, though less happy and agreeable, 
will not necessarily be dissolved.  Society may subsist among different 
men, as among different merchants, from a sense of its utility, without any 
mutual love or affection … (Theory of Moral Sentiments II:ii:3). 
All society required was justice, “the main pillar which upholds the whole edifice.” 
It was not, however, until G.W. F. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1820) that the 
domain Smith had explored was finally termed “civil society” [bürgerliche Gesellschaft]  
and explicitly juxtaposed to the state (Schmidt 1981, Riedel 1984, 129-156).  Hegel had 
read Smith as early as 1803, but it was not until lectures in Berlin in 1818 that he first 
employed a tripartite division between “family,” “civil society,” and “state” (Hegel 1974, 
I:189).  As articulated in the Philosophy of Right, “civil society” encompasses not only 
                                                
3 At the risk of being tedious, it should be noted that Mandeville’s use of the term 
“society” remains quite conventional. “I hope the reader knows,” he writes in “A 
Search into the Nature of Society,” “that by Society I understand a Body Politick”  
(Mandeville 1924,  I:347).  Note also the confounding of “society” and “politik” in 
Mandeville’s indexing of his comparison of “the Body Politik” with a “Bowl of 
Punch” (I:105, 378). 
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the “system of needs” that had been the particular concern of political economists but 
also the system of civil law that makes exchange relationships possible and the public and 
private agencies (the “police” and the “corporations”) that carry out the supervisory and 
welfare functions a market society requires.  Civil society is, for Hegel, a creature of the 
modern world, presenting a “spectacle of extravagance and want” that is historically 
unprecedented (§185).  It was the world of the “Bürger as bourgeois” (§ 190), the 
individual who, driven onward in a relentless pursuit of self-interest, brings into existence 
a social order that transcends the intentions of any given individual (§187). 
Civil society, as Hegel understood it, is thus a curious mixture.  It is rooted in the 
market, but cannot be reduced to it.  It includes political and legal functions that were, for 
reasons that baffled Hegel’s first readers (Riedel 1975, 70, 130-131, 134-135), split off 
from the subsequent discussion of the state.  Hegel stated that civil society represents the 
state “as understanding [Verstand] envisions it” (§ 183), it is an account of the state that 
grasped only the “external” attributes of political life and hence reduced the state to a set 
of contractual relations between individuals who view their own ends as absolute and see 
interactions with others — and with the state itself — as a way of achieving these ends 
(Steinberger 1988, 202-205, 234-235).  It is a theoretically impoverished, albeit 
historically important, account of the state, and it is an account that Hegel seeks to 
incorporate and overcome with his own conception of the state as the “actuality of ethical 
life” (§257).  For him the state is not a means to individual ends, but rather the foundation 
which gives substance to individual freedom. 
When removed from the particular place it occupied within Hegel’s system, what 
Hegel had denoted as “civil society” is changed in both its function and its contents.  No 
longer a part of a broader philosophical argument about the possibilities for the 
realization of freedom in the modern world, it is viewed instead as a sphere of activities, 
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distinct from political society or the state.  From here it was a short step to dispensing 
with the now-antiquated term “civil” altogether and speaking simply of “society.”  
In the account of “The Concept of Society and its Dynamic Laws” that opened 
Lorenz von Stein’s History of the Social Movement in France (1850),  “society” is hailed 
as one of those things that had “formerly remained unrecorded in everyday life” but 
which now, as a result of “powerful events,” stands revealed as “a force permeating the 
life of nations and of individuals” (Stein 1964, 43).  After centuries in which men had 
sought “to formulate the principle of the state,”  the idea had finally dawned that it might 
be possible to do the same for the “principle of society” (54).    
The community of men whose organic unity of will is expressed through 
the personality of the state achieves in that social order an equally stable, 
equally great, and equally powerful organic unity of its life;  this organic 
unity, conditioned by the distribution of possessions, regulated by the 
organization of labor, set in motion through human needs, and bound to 
the family, is human society  (50).  
For Stein, the state is “the personal organism of the general will”  that integrates 
individuals into an order that allows for the “full and harmonious development” of each.  
In contrast, society is the “general and stable order” established “on the basis of the 
natural components of life”  in which certain classes are subordinated to other classes.  
These two different forms of community are locked in a permanent struggle in which the 
state attempts to maintain general interests against the particularism of society (51, 54). 
Stein constructed his dichotomy of state and society by splitting apart what 
Hegel’s notion of civil society had joined together.  He merged the domain of production 
and exchange that constituted Hegel’s “System of Needs” with the family to form what 
he now termed simply “society.”  He assigned the system of civil law, which Hegel had 
placed within civil society, to the state, along with those police and regulatory functions 
that Hegel had also regarded as functions of civil society.  Where Hegel’s civil society 
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included factors that work to integrate society as well as ones that fragment it (Cohen and 
Arato 1992, 95-102, 106-116),  Stein’s dichotomy of state and society assigned the task 
of unifying the community to the state alone (57).  Stein dedicated the rest of his life to 
the development of a science of the state that could provide practical insight to the civil 
servants assigned the daunting task of articulating the general good against a society 
riven with class divisions.  Hence, he never studied those “powers and elements” with 
“neither a name nor a law” (43) that he had christened “society.”  Leaving that task to 
others, he argued 
It is only through the concept of society that the concepts and sciences of 
economics, of labor, of householding economy and of national economy, 
of the family and of law, gain their highest common perspective.  Only 
here do they attain the highest point of this worldly life, i.e. the individual 
and the fulfillment of his destiny (50).   
Economics, labor, the family, and law — here is one way of defining society, one set of 
“social things” for the social sciences to explore.  But it was only one possible definition, 
only one potential set of objects.  To some find others, we need to see how else the notion 
of civil society was employed. 
 
Civil Society and Ecclesiastical Society 
A different understanding of society emerged from the opposition of civil society 
to ecclesiastical society.  As in the distinction between civil society and domestic society, 
“civil society” here denoted a political order defined by contrasting it to an order that 
pursued ends viewed as not properly political.  Thus Locke, in his 1689 Letter 
Concerning Toleration distinguished “civil government” (res civitatis) — a “Society of 
Men constituted only for preserving and advancing their civil goods” — from the 
“church” — a “voluntary Society of Men, joining themselves together” for “the publick 
worshipping of God” and “the Salvation of their Souls” (Locke 1983, 26, 28).  Kant, in a 
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more complex formulation,  described the state as a “juridical-civil society [rechtliche 
bürgerliche Geschellschaft]” and contrasted it to the “ethical-civil society [ethische 
bürgerliche Gesellschaft]” of the church, though he quickly suggested that perhaps a 
more apt description of the ecclesiastical order would be “a household (family) under a 
common, though invisible, moral Father” (Kant 1960, 86-88, 90-91, 93).  For both Locke 
and Kant, as well as for the countless other eighteenth century thinkers who distinguished 
between the claims of the church and the state, political society is governed by coercive 
laws that restrict individuals’ external relations with one another in the interest of 
preserving life and property.  The church, in contrast, is a purely voluntary order lacking 
the coercive power of the state but pursuing a loftier goal:  the salvation of souls. 
As invoked in the eighteenth century, the distinction between civil and 
ecclesiastical orders typically employed the theoretical vocabulary provided by social 
contract theories.  Kant, perhaps, went furthest in this direction, postulating both a 
“juridical state of nature” and an “ethical state of nature,” deriving the civil order from 
the former and the ecclesiastical order from the latter (Kant 1960, 87-90).  The 
distinction, of course, predated social contract theories, but even in its earliest 
formulations it was permeated — like Christian theology itself4 — with political and 
juridical metaphors.  Thus Augustine spoke of “two cities or societies [duae civitates hoc 
est societates],” the civitas Dei  and the civitas terrena (Civ. Dei XII:i) and Aquinas 
followed suit, juxtaposing the communitas civilis  to the communitas divina (Summa 
Theo. 1, 2 qu. 100, art. 2c).  While there are enormous differences between Augustine 
and Aquinas on the one hand and social contract theories on the other,  the rough outline 
                                                
4 For a discussion of the wholesale appropriation of Roman legal terminology into 
Christian theology, see Ullmann 1965, 21, 24-32.  See also the discussion of the 
ambiguity of Augustine’s use of salus (salvation/security) and fides (faith/honor) in 
Cumming 1969, Vol. I 311-314. 
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of the distinction between the civil and the ecclesiastical orders remains similar:  civil 
society pursues those earthly goods that are necessary for man’s physical survival, while 
the church is concerned with the care and salvation of souls. 
There would, of course, have been no point in Locke’s or Kant’s denying that the 
state was concerned with the salvation of souls had there not been theories that tended to 
blur the boundaries between politics and religion.  Hobbes is the most obvious case.  
Hailed by Rousseau as unique in having “dared to propose the reunification of the two 
heads of the eagle, the complete return to political unity, without which no state or 
government can ever be well constituted” (Social Contract IV:iii), he maintained that no 
distinction was possible between “the Kingdome of God” and “Civill Government” or 
between the “Sword of Justice” and the “Shield of Faith.”  “Temporal and Spirituall 
Government,” he insisted, “are but two words brought into the world to make men see 
double and mistake their Lawfull Soveraign” (Leviathan III:39, III:35).  Since the 
“maintenance of Civill Society” depends on justice, and justice ultimately rests “on the 
Power of Life and Death,” it would be impossible for civil society to survive were there 
another power capable “of giving greater rewards than Life, and of inflicting greater 
punishments, than Death” (Leviathan III:38).  No one but the sovereign could be 
permitted to dispense a reward so tempting as eternal life or a punishment so potent as 
eternal damnation.  As Hobbes presented it, the prerequisite for salvation  — a simple 
admission that Christ is Lord — was so simple that the sovereign need not be troubled 
with securing anything other than the public observation of religious practices (Glover 
1965).  The “inward thought and beleef of men” can be safely ignored by “humane 
Gouvernours,” since they can be known by God alone and, in any case, could not 
possibly be compelled by laws (Leviathan III:40).  Posed in this way, the distinction 
between publicly professed and privately held beliefs becomes isomorphic with the 
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distinction between civil and domestic society. 
The implications of this division have been elaborated in Reinhart Koselleck’s  
provocative – albeit historically questionable (Wilson 1991) – account of the role of 
secret societies as “indirect powers” engaged in a “moralizing” critique of state power 
(Koselleck 1988).  Koselleck argues that Hobbes’ distinction between private and civil 
beliefs provided the framework for the critique of civil society undertaken by secret 
societies such as the Freemason and the Illuminati.  Such groups recruited their members 
from a stratum of society that “shared the fate of being unable to find an adequate place 
within the Absolutist State’s existing institutions.”  Denied access to positions in the 
state, the members of this stratum met in “wholly ‘non-political’ localities” such as 
coffee-houses, clubs, and salons.   
The outcome was an institutionalization behind the scenes, one whose 
political strength could not unfold openly …  From the outset, rather, the 
representatives of society could exert political influence only indirectly, if 
at all (66-67). 
More careful students of secret societies, free of both Koselleck’s dependence on 
discredited conspiracy theories and his distaste for the ideals of the Enlightenment, have 
examined the diversity of needs such organizations satisfied (Jacob 1991, Dülmen 1992).  
In an age where many individuals no longer found meaning in the rituals of orthodox 
religion the ceremonies associated with some of these societies may well have provided 
an appealing and powerful substitute.  In a political system that provided few 
opportunities for the exercise of political agency outside of the bureaucratic structure of 
the monarchical state, others of these societies provided an arena in which political 
opinions could be debated and programs for reform articulated.  And finally, in a society 
with a strictly defined social hierarchy, these societies provided a setting in which 
members of different religions, professional groups, and social classes could come into 
contact with one other and find a fellowship and solidarity that was not available in the 
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public realm.  In the practices and ceremonies of the such societies, one can see the 
origins of a form of society, separate from both the church and the state, that rested on the 
free association of individuals.5 
The thinker who played, with respect to the forms of association that emerged in 
the space between the church and the state, a role similar to that played by Hegel and 
Stein vis à vis the notion of society that arose between political society and domestic 
society was Alexis de Tocqueville.  In a note, drafted shortly before commencing work 
on Democracy in America he distinguished between: 
Political society [société politique] — Relations between the federal and 
state governments and [between] the citizen of the Union and of each 
state. 
Civil society [société civile] — Relations of the citizens among 
themselves. 
Religious society [société religieuse] — Relations between God and the 
members of society, and of the religious sects among themselves.6 
Religious society and political society involve relations either between individuals and 
superior powers or between groups of associated individuals.  The term “civil society” is 
reserved for that domain in which individuals join together, free from the control of either 
the state or the church.   
In distinguishing civil society from political society, Tocqueville was following 
the lead of his teacher François Guizot and his mentor Pierre-Paul Royer-Collard.  Like 
Hegel, they had distinguished between state and civil society, and on the basis of this 
distinction had argued that it would impossible for France to return to the form of 
                                                
5 For a powerful argument on the role of the Masonic movement in institutionalizing 
the norms for this society, see Margaret C. Jacob, “The Enlightenment Redefined:  
The Formation of Modern Civil Society” Social Research 58:2 (1991) pp. 475-495. 
6 Manuscript draft for Democracy in America cited in Schleifer 1980, 7. 
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government that had preceded the massive social transformation which led to the 
Revolution (Siedentop 1979, 153-174 and Siedentop 1994, 20-40).  In his study of 
American democracy, Tocqueville pressed the distinction further, distinguishing political 
forms of association from what he termed “civil associations.”  The former were 
established, in part, to oppose actions by the state and thus to preserve the 
“independence” of the citizenry.  The latter, which addressed the needs of “daily life,” 
aimed at the preservation of “civilization” itself.  Without them, the citizens of a 
democracy would descend into “barbarism” (Tocqueville 1969, 514-515).  In the same 
way, Tocqueville distinguished between “political equality,” which he defined as “taking 
the same part in government,” and “equality in civil society,” which involved “the right 
to enjoy the same pleasures, to engage in the same professions, and to meet in the same 
places — in a word, to live in the same manner and seek wealth by the same means” 
(503).  While Tocqueville may have begun Democracy in America with the idea of 
distinguishing “civil society” from both “political society” and “religious society,”  in 
executing the book he focused so exclusively on the opposition between political society 
and civil society that when he came to discuss “religious associations” they became one 
example, among others, within the broader class of “civil associations” (513).  
Thus, in his use of “civil society” Tocqueville employed a term that had once 
been used to denote a political, as opposed to a domestic or religious society, and pressed 
it into service to denote, not the political constitution of a society, but rather the social 
interactions between its members.  What he did with “civil society” was repeated, with 
greater ambiguity, in his use of the term that denoted the ultimate concern of the book:  
“democracy.”  Departing from the conventional use of the term as a name for a specific 
form of government, Tocqueville used it to describe a type of society that can take on a 
number of different political forms.   Despotism and representative democracy are 
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equally plausible political forms of “democratic societies.”  In his drafts for Democracy 
in America, Tocqueville struggled to clarify what exactly he meant by “democratie” 
suggesting at one point that the term referred to the “état social” of the Americans — 
their society’s “maniére d’être.”  In contrast, their particular form of government, as 
expressed in the political laws that governed them, might best be denoted by the notion 
“sovereignty of the people.”  “Democratie” would thus appear to be a matter of customs 
and mores (moeurs) while popular sovereignty was one possible legal form that a 
democratic society might take (Schleifer 263-274). 
In the Introduction to Democracy in America, however, “democratie” took on an 
even broader set of implications, referring to something more fundamental than either 
moeurs or lois.  Tocqueville argued that the influence of the “equality of conditions” he 
had observed in America “extends far beyond political mores and laws, exercising 
dominion over civil society as much as over the government; it creates opinions, gives 
birth to feelings, suggests customs, and modifies whatever it does not create” (9).  Indeed, 
the impact of what he had observed in America went far beyond the New World.  “A 
great democratic revolution is taking place in our midst” (9) and “there is hardly an 
important event in the last seven hundred years which has not turned out to be 
advantageous for equality” (11). 
Everywhere the diverse happenings in the lives of peoples have turned to 
democracy’s profit; all men’s efforts have aided it, both those who 
intended this and those who had no such intention, those who fought for 
democracy and those who were the declared enemies thereof;  all have 
been driven pell-mell along the same road, and all have worked together, 
some against their will and some unconsciously, blind instruments in the 
hand of God. (11-12) 
At his most apocalyptic, Tocqueville regarded the progress of democracy as evidence of 
God’s will.  Thus, he confessed, “This whole book has been written under the impulse of 
a kind of religious dread inspired by the contemplation of this irresistible revolution 
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advancing century by century over every obstacle and even now going forward amid the 
ruins it has itself created” (12).  Thus, while “religious society” was folded into “civil 
society” when Tocqueville collapsed his initial tripartite scheme into a simple opposition 
between political and civil society, the revolution which transformed both political and 
civil society became nothing less than the work of Providence itself. 
Both the ambiguities in the meaning of “democratie” and the prophetic fervor that 
marked the Introduction testify to the novelty of Tocqueville’s undertaking.  He was 
proposing a way of thinking about civil society that turned from the consideration of 
political forms to probe the patterns of association, the customs, manners, and mores, the 
“habits of the heart” that defined a new society.  Here, then, was yet another cluster of 
“social things,” different in character from those uncovered by Hegel, but no less 
promising as a field on which a science of society might be established. 
 
Civil Society and Rude Society 
In the final use of “civil society” considered here, the term is juxtaposed to “rude” 
society.  This contrast was employed by Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, and other Scottish 
moralists as well as by Turgot, Condorcet, and, with rather different intentions, by 
Rousseau (Riedel 1972, 748-753).  This opposition also entered German thought, thanks 
to the rapid translation of key Scottish texts (Oz-Salzberger 1995) and the following 
Smith and Ferguson enjoyed among scholars at Göttingen and Königsberg.  Yet, despite 
the popularity of the distinction, it remains somewhat puzzling what exactly “civil 
society” denotes here.  Does it designate, as in the other pairings we have seen, a 
“political” as opposed to a non-political society or does it refer more generally to a 
society which is distinguished by a progress of “civilization,” a “refinement” of manners 
and customs? 
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Dugald Stewart, one of the last representatives of the tradition of Scottish moral 
philosophy, seemed to suggest the latter in his discussions of the achievements of the 
school.  His Dissertation Exhibiting the Progress of Metaphysical, Ethical, and Political 
Philosophy Since the Revival of Letters in Europe (1815, 1821) argued that the 
“particular glory of the latter half of the eighteenth century” lay in the application of the 
“natural or theoretical history of society” to such diverse concerns as the history of 
languages, the arts, the sciences, law, government, manners, and religion (Stewart 1854, 
I:170).  This approach, which he described elsewhere as a “Theoretical or Conjectural 
History,”  attempted to reconstruct the stages that led from “the first simple efforts of 
uncultivated nature, to a state of things so wonderfully artificial and complicated” 
(Stewart 1854, X:33-34).  Understood in this way, the “natural history of civil society” 
would appear to be nothing less than a general history of refinement and civilization, 
encompassing a good deal more than what earlier theorists had classified under the 
heading “civil society.”   
Stewart saw Adam Smith’s contribution to the study of politics as residing in his 
elaboration of this approach.  As Stewart read him, Smith had not limited himself to the 
traditional concerns of studying forms of government or giving prudential advice to 
rulers, but rather focused on the way in which the social benefits of political association 
were distributed, thus posing the question of justice in a novel way (Stewart 1854, X:54, 
56).  Like Hume and Ferguson, Smith was seen as rejecting social contract theories in 
favor of an approach that regarded civil society, not as the consequence of a conscious act 
of association and subordination, but rather as the product of an evolutionary process 
leading from rudeness to civility.  Smith himself credited Polybius as having been the 
first to enter “into the civil history of the nations he treats”  and suggested that, even 
earlier, Thucydides went beyond a simple chronicle of military achievements and had 
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begun to explore “political and civil history” (Smith 1983, 107-108).  What distinguished 
these ancient efforts from those of Smith and his contemporaries? 
Thucydides opened his account of the Peloponnesian war with a discussion of the 
origins of the contestants.  He described a state in which common action was impossible, 
where (in the words of Thomas Hobbes’ translation) “traffic was not, nor mutual 
intercourse but with fear …; and every man so husbanded the ground as but barely to live 
upon it, without any stock or riches, and planted nothing.”  This miserable state was first 
left by the Athenians, who “were the first that laid by their armour, and growing civil, 
passed into a more tender kind of life” (Thucydides I:2, 6).  Both the content and the 
form of the argument should, by now, be familiar:  the description is close to the accounts 
that Hobbes and others would give of departures from the state of nature.   But while 
social contract theorists were reasonably clear that the state of nature they juxtaposed to 
civil society was an analytic construct intended to illuminate the central characterisics of 
political society, rather than an actual historical condition, the status of the condition that 
preceded civil life in these ancient “civil histories” remained obscure. 
In a discussion of accounts of the origins of polities offered “by Plato and other 
philosophers” Polybius asked, “What then are the beginnings I speak of and what is the 
first origin of polities?”  His answer drew on mythical accounts of catastrophic events 
that destroyed much of the human race, along with all of its arts and its crafts, and forced 
the scattered survivors to join together “owing to their natural weakness” (Histories 
VI.5).  Once political communities of this sort had been established, Polybius traced how 
forms of government replaced one another.  There are thus two sequences at work in 
Polybius’ account:  within civil society Polybius provides a cyclical history of forms of 
government, outside civil society he speaks of a transition from rudeness to civility.  A 
similar dualism can be found in subsequent authors.  Machiavelli, for instance, employed 
Schmidt - Civil Society and Social Things  24 
a cyclical account of forms of government in the Discourses, while imitating Livy’s 
account of origins at the start of the Discourses (I:i) and the History of Florence (II:i).  
The “poetic economy” of Book II of Vico’s New Science makes use of mythical accounts 
to describe the gathering of famuli in cities (II:iv), while the cyclical account of the 
“course the nations run” in Book IV is set apart from the consideration of origins.  These 
two sequences could become one history only if some way could be found to explain 
both the passage from rudeness to civility and the replacement of one form of 
government by another as consequences of the same process. 
The “four-stage theory” attributed to eighteenth century Scottish and French 
writers by Andrew Skinner (1967) and Ronald Meek (1976) would appear to provide 
such an explanation of the origins and the transformation of political society.  By 
focusing on “modes of subsistence” — hunting and gathering, pastoral, agricultural, 
commercial — such a theory offered a way of classifying societies in terms of something 
other than their forms of government.  By arguing that these modes of subsistence 
uniformly follow one another, it offered a way of organizing the diversity of forms of life 
that could be observed among peoples scattered throughout the world into an 
evolutionary sequence:  societies of hunters and gatherers were thus seen, not as 
completely alien from commercial societies, but rather as occupying a less advanced 
stage in the process of civilization.  A history executed in this fashion saw civil society as 
the final stage in the development of modes of social and economic cooperation.  
Smith, however, never utilized the four-stage theory in his published writings 
with anything approaching the simplicity with which it was presented in his Lectures on 
Jurisprudence.  In the Wealth of Nations, for instance, the four-stage account of the 
Lectures is spread over several chapters and is not limited to a discussion of modes of 
subsistence.  Such factors as historical antecedents, geography, and individual personality 
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matter as much as modes of subsistence (Winch 1978, 63-64).  Nor does the four-stage 
theory make a clear distinction between “civil society” and “civilized society”:  “civil,” 
“civility,” and “civilization” have virtually interchangeable political, social, and cultural 
connotations (Rothblatt 1976, 17-22).  Nowhere is this clearer than in the first German 
translations of Smith’s Wealth of Nations.  His translators faced the choice of either 
importing Smith’s terminology into German, a strategy adopted in J. F. Schiller’s 1776-
1778 translation, or providing German equivalents for what Smith appeared to be saying, 
the course taken by Christian Garve in his 1794-1796 translation.  Thus, in a section of 
the book where Schiller consistently employed “civilisirten Gesellschaft” and 
“civilisirten Staate,”  Garve rendered Smith’s “civilized society” as “verfeinerte 
Völkern,” “bürgerliche Gesellschaft,” “gesitteten und aufgeklärte Staate,” and “Staat in 
Ganzen, in Anbau, Kunstfleisse und Handel forgerückt.”7  “Civilized” societies, then, 
have “refined” customs and mores, they have a flourishing commercial life, and they 
have well-developed systems of civil law.  Social and political factors are so intimately 
intertwined in the definition of what constitutes a “civilized” or a “civil” society that it is 
difficult to attribute an explicit distinction between “social” and “political” factors to 
Smith. 
  While the “four-stage theory” may not provide an unambiguous distinction 
between economic and social evolution and the development of political and legal forms, 
something approximating a distinction between “civil” and “civilized” society emerges 
from discussions of the relationship between the development of commerce and the 
progress of liberty (Forbes, 1975).  The conventional “Whig” assumption that commerce 
and liberty went hand in hand foundered on cases such as France or China,  nations that 
                                                
7 Cf. Smith, Wealth of Nations (V:I:iii:2), Schiller 1776-1778 462-473, Garve 1794-
1796, 162-173. 
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were obviously “civilized,” but which, owing to their forms of government, could not 
unambiguously be classified as “civil” societies.  The case of China was particularly 
troubling for Adam Ferguson, since it provided a grim image of the destiny commercial 
societies.  Citing the example of ancient Athens, Ferguson argued that “men ceased to be 
good citizens, even to be good poets and orators, in proportion as they came to be 
distinguished by the profession of these, and other separate crafts” (Ferguson 1980, 218).  
As citizens devoted themselves to the pursuit of private ends, society was divided into a 
host of separate occupations and offices, where, as in the case of China, “conduct consists 
in detail, and in the observance of forms” (226).  Reflecting on whether the rule of a 
despot over an atomized and alienated body of citizens could be properly termed a 
“political order,” Ferguson concluded 
Our notion of order in civil society is frequently false:  it is taken from the 
analogy of subjects inanimate and dead; we consider commotion and 
action as contrary to its nature;  we think it consistent only with obedience, 
secrecy, and the silent passing of affairs through the hands of the few.  The 
good order of stones in a wall, is their being properly fixed in the places 
for which they are hewn;  were they to stir the building must fall:  but the 
order of men in society, is their being placed where they are properly 
qualified to act.  The first is a fabric made of dead and inanimate parts, the 
second is made of living and active members.  When we seek in society 
for the order of mere inaction and tranquility, we forget the nature of our 
subject, and find the order of slaves, not that of men. (268-269) 
Ferguson’s concern lay with the defense of the civic republican ideal of an active and 
engaged citizenry and his conception of civil society remained tied to this vision.  But his 
vision of a “society” made up of “dead and inanimate parts” pointed to an alternative 
conception of society as a domain governed by impersonal forces whose development 
worked against the achievement of free forms of human association.  It was this order 
that, reversing Ferguson’s terminology, Karl Marx called “civil society.” 
Looking back on his early critique of Hegel, Marx recalled 
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My investigations led to the result that legal relations as well as forms of 
the state are to be grasped neither from themselves nor from the so-called 
general development of the human mind, but rather have their roots in the 
material conditions of life, the sum total of which Hegel, following the 
example of the Englishmen and Frenchmen of the eighteenth century, 
combines under the name of “civil society,” that, however, the anatomy of 
civil society is to be sought in political economy. (Marx 1970, 20). 
This passage is well known, but also somewhat perplexing.  It reduces Hegel’s notion of 
“civil society” to the first of its three components — the “System of Needs” — and 
credits this usage to certain eighteenth century “Englishmen and Frenchmen.”  The 
“Englishmen” he had in mind were presumably Smith and his fellow Scots, while the  
Frenchmen who used the term this way — de Tocqueville, Guizot, and Royer-Collard — 
were not eighteenth century thinkers.  While Marx may have been mistaken about what 
“civil society” meant for any of these thinkers — Hegel’s notion of civil society is 
identical neither with Scottish nor French accounts — the fruit of Marx’s confusion was a 
powerful and influential way of thinking about society.  It is worth untangling the steps 
that led him to it. 
He took his point of departure from Hegel’s distinction between state and civil 
society, but in his 1843 Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right 
insisted that Hegel had “inverted” their relationship by transforming “real subjects” such 
as civil society and the family into “unreal elements” of the “mystical” notion of the state 
(Marx 1975, 3:8-9).  In On the Jewish Question, he drew on Tocqueville and Beaumont’s 
account of the relationship between religion and politics in America to repose the 
problem of the relation of “political emancipation and religion” as a relation between 
“political emancipation and human emancipation,”  arguing that 
Where the political state has attained to its true development, man …  
leads a double life, a heavenly and an earthly life:  life in the political 
community, in which he considers himself a communal being, and life in 
civil society, in which he acts as a private individual, regards other men as 
means, degrades himself into a means, and becomes the plaything of alien 
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powers.  (Marx 1975, 3:154). 
Political society provides only an imaginary solution to the antagonisms of civil society, 
and the ideal of political emancipation represents only the liberation of “man as 
bourgeois” — the creature of civil society — not “human emancipation.”   
By 1845, Marx was employing “civil society” in two related, but distinguishable 
ways, as can be seen in a passage from The German Ideology that fully exploited the 
ambiguity of the term “bürgerliche Gesellschaft.” 
Civil society embraces the whole material intercourse of individuals within 
a definite stage of the development of productive forces.  It embraces the 
whole commercial and industrial life of a given stage and, insofar, 
transcends the state and the nation, though, on the other hand, it must 
assert itself in its external relations as nationality and internally must 
organize itself as a state.  The term “civil society” emerged in the 
eighteenth century, when property relationships had already extricated 
themselves from the ancient and medieval communal society.  Civil 
society as such only develops with the bourgeoisie; the social organization 
evolving directly out of production and commerce, which in all ages forms 
the basis of the state and of the rest of the idealistic superstructure, has, 
however, always been designated by the same name. (Marx 1975, 5:89). 
As “bourgeois society,” bürgerliche Gesellschaft refers to a specific historical period, to a 
particular way of organizing the material intercourse between human beings.  
Transnational in scope, it ultimately determines the particular forms in which politics is 
conducted.  This sense of the term is contrasted with the ideal of a “human society, or 
socialized humanity” (Marx, 1975, 5:5) in which human needs are satisfied within a 
society that is no longer divided into antagonistic classes.  But understood as “civil 
society,” bürgerliche Gesellschaft refers to a dimension of all previous societies that has 
been ignored by historians whose interest had been confined to “high sounding dramas of 
princes and states.”   In this usage, civil society becomes “the true source and theater of 
all history” (Marx 1975, 5:50).  Here, then, is a third set of “social things” — material 
relations of production — and another foundation on which a science of society might 
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arise:  a science which, by studying the contradictory development of productive 
relations, would provide us with an insight into the “anatomy” of civil society.   
 
Anatomy Lessons 
By the middle of the nineteenth century, the notion of “civil society” had lost its 
traditional equivalence with the “state” or “political society.”  In Hegel it came to 
designate the sphere of economic production and exchange and the legal and social 
institutions that made such activities possible.  For Tocqueville, it was a sphere of 
voluntary associations sustained by the unique set of customs, habits, and social 
arrangements that he called “democracy.”  For Marx, civil society was “bourgeois 
society,” a particular historical form of the process of material production.  If we combine 
these differing definitions of civil society, we find most of the “social things” that have 
kept social scientists busy over the last century and a half.  If we keep them separate, we 
can see some of the main lines of contention about how the science that is supposed to 
make sense of these things should proceed.  Where is the anatomy of civil society to be 
sought?  Should the focus fall on the institutions that shape social life, on the customs and 
traditions that tie society together, or on the economic structure of society? 
Perhaps because it was so elegantly simple, Marx’s account of civil society 
exercised the most powerful attraction and drew the most energetic criticism.  His vision 
was nothing if not audacious.  The vast ideological superstructure  (law, politics, religion, 
art, and philosophy) rested ultimately on “civil society”  (the “sum total” of the “material 
conditions of life”) and the basic “anatomy” of civil society was provided by political 
economy.  In a science of society constructed along these lines, society is understood as 
an attempt to master external nature and control fellow human beings.  Social actions are 
seen as driven by an instrumental calculus of means and ends.  Social relations are 
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viewed as fundamentally antagonistic, just as society itself is fundamentally divided 
against itself. 
The subsequent development of the social sciences can viewed, in part, as 
questioning the primacy Marx accorded to political economy in laying out the anatomy of 
civil society.  Weber’s classification of action orientations opened up the investigation of 
forms of rationality other than those associated with economic efficiency (Tester 1992, 
113-118).  Durkheim emphasized the importance of the relationships between religion 
and society that had served as Tocqueville’s point of departure (Seidman 1983, 152-178).  
Mead and others stressed the role of communicative interaction in forming the ties that 
bind individuals together in society (Habermas 1989, 3-42).  The history of social theory 
since Marx has thus been the story of contesting approaches, each with differing sense of 
how society is to be understood and, hence, with differing ideas about what should count 
as a “social thing.”   
The determination of what is to count as a “social thing” remains open-ended 
because civil society is itself multifaceted.  A recent discussion sees it as encompassing 
families, informal groups, voluntary associations, cultural and communicative 
institutions, individual moral systems, laws, and individual rights (Cohen & Arato 1992, 
346).   This ambiguity has long made civil society a fruitful hunting ground for those 
searching for the things upon which a science of society might be based.  The very 
fecundity of civil society as a source of social things has made the idea that there is one 
particular subset of things that can explain all the rest look rather suspect and rendered 
efforts to draw the boundaries of social inquiry too emphatically increasingly fruitless.   
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